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1 Introduction 
Corruption or the abuse of public office for public gain is bad for society. Among its 
many ills, economists have reported that corruption reduces economic growth (Knack 
and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004), 
increases income and educational inequalities (Gupta et al. 2002), reduces spending on 
health and education (Mauro 1998; Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2001) and enlarges 
the underground economy, thus reducing government revenues (Johnson et al. 1998).  
Because of the negative impact of corruption on desirable socio-economic objectives, 
social scientists have attempted to identify the factors that drive malfeasance. These 
include economic conditions, such as the level of economic development (Treisman 
2000), income inequalities (You and Khagram 2005), political factors, such as the level 
of democracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008) and electoral rules (Persson et al. 2003), and 
cultural factors (Fisman and Miguel 2007) that have been linked to religious affiliations 
(La Porta et al. 1999).   
Several authors have identified the pernicious effect of natural resources on governance. 
The natural resource sector is one characterized by state regulation and large rents and 
profits that result in part from the absence of competitive market conditions (Ades and 
Di Tella 1999). This combination of rents and regulation creates opportunities for 
corrupt behavior by public officials. In line with this, the empirical evidence to date has 
tended to confirm the links between natural resource endowments and corruption (see, 
for example, Aslaksen 2009 and Busse and Gröning 2013). Moreover, scholars have 
identified the existence of a “resource curse”, such that natural resources, by increasing 
corruption, tend to reduce rather than increase economic growth (Leite and Weidmann 
2002; Isham et al. 2005; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2013).  
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Inspired by this literature, in this article we turn to another sector of the economy – the 
construction sector – which is similarly characterized by relatively high value 
investments and significant government interactions, thus providing opportunities for 
rent creation and extraction by corrupt public officials (Hardoon and Heinrich 2011). 
The construction market in most countries is split between a competitive segment 
composed of large number of small contractors and an oligopolistic, often cartelized 
tranche, made up of a limited number of firms handling the larger construction projects 
(OECD 2008; Kenny 2009). The sector includes both publicly and privately financed 
construction projects and government intervention can take several forms, the most 
obvious being public tenders to undertake public investment projects and local 
government zoning or town planning decisions that affect the construction of private 
housing.  
In line with empirical work exploring the impact of natural resources on governance, we 
posit that countries with larger construction sectors, both in terms of volume and as a 
percentage of Gross Value Added (GVA),
1
 are likely to suffer from more corruption. 
We explore this by way of an unbalanced panel of 42 mostly middle and high income 
countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We find that a more economically important 
construction sector tends to increase perceptions of corruption even after controlling for 
a range of potentially confounding variables and the real possibility that corrupt 
officials may promote the development of the construction sector since it increases the 
resources appropriable by them.  
                                                          
1
 GVA measures the contribution to the economy of each individual industry or sector by 
estimating the value of an output (goods or services) less the value of inputs used in that output's 
production process. GVA relates to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as follows: GDP = GVA + 
taxes on products – subsidies on products.  
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This article is structured as follows. In the next section we develop the reasoning behind 
the expectation that a larger construction sector will tend to increase corruption, and 
review current evidence of corruption in that sector. We then present how we measure 
our key variables and explain our empirical approach. Finally, we report and discuss our 
main empirical findings before concluding the article. 
2 Construction and corruption: theory and existing evidence 
According to one estimate, corruption in the construction industry accounts for an 
estimated $340 billion of worldwide construction costs each year, representing 10% of 
construction’s global market value (ASCE 2004). Corruption in the industry leads to 
cost overruns, poor quality construction, inefficient project selection and deficient 
maintenance (Kenny 2006, 2009), and has been linked to earthquake-related injuries 
and deaths caused by sub-standard buildings and infrastructure (Escaleras et al. 2007). 
Corruption in public construction projects is particularly damaging for developing 
countries with important infrastructural deficiencies and scarce resources (Hardoon and 
Heinrich 2011).  
The industrial organization of the construction industry across countries speaks to the 
availability of large rents that can fuel corruption. National construction sectors are 
characterized mainly by the presence of a limited number of big firms having the 
capacity to undertake large construction projects. Perhaps not surprisingly then, 
competition in the construction industry tends to be imperfect, with anti-competitive 
practices occurring frequently, mostly in the guise of collusive agreements between 
firms. In this respect, the OECD (2008) documents a series of high-profile examples of 
construction cartels brought to light during 1997-2007 in several countries, including, 
Turkey, South Korea, Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. This 
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collusion takes several forms, such as bid rigging, sales restrictions, price fixing and 
market allocation deals.  
A range of mostly qualitative country case studies have considered the nature of 
corruption in the construction industry (see Le et al. 2014 for a survey). Corruption can 
occur at any stage of a construction project, from planning and design, bidding and 
construction to operation and maintenance. It can manifest itself in many related forms, 
including bribing public officials involved in key decisions affecting private and public 
construction projects, bid rigging by public administrators to ensure that a favored 
tenderor wins the project, or even the extortion of construction companies to extract 
bribes. And several factors have been identified as contributing towards corruption in 
the construction sector, including ethical preferences related to culture, ineffective legal 
systems, insufficient transparency in tenders, asymmetric information among tenderees, 
difficulties in benchmarking for cost and time given the uniqueness of many 
construction projects, and the practice of subcontracting, which makes the tracing of 
payments and the diffusion of “best practice” standards more complex.  
From a theoretical perspective, the combination of government intervention and large 
rents flowing from imperfect competition will tend to increase corruption. Why this 
may be so has been uncovered in work studying the impact of the natural resources on 
corruption. Leite and Weidman (2002) argue that the availability of large rents in the 
resources sector can lead private agents to compete for them by paying bribes to public 
officials in exchange for administrative approvals of their investment projects. From a 
different perspective, assuming that bureaucrats vary as to the values they assign to 
honest dealings, and for a given bureaucratic wage scale, the large rents characteristic of 
the natural resource sector increase the incentive of bureaucrats who regulate the sector 
to engage in malfeasant behavior (Ades and Di Tella 1999).  Finally, corruption may 
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emerge from the interaction of private and public agents in the context of rents that may 
accrue to the public sector either directly, as owners of natural resources, or indirectly, 
through taxation of private sector owners of them. 
Although this discussion is framed in terms of corruption, we must be clear that our 
analysis falls squarely within the rent-seeking literature. Corruption involving bribes to 
politicians and bureaucrats is a type of rent-seeking in as much as the latter has been 
defined as the employment of scarce resources to obtain an artificially created transfer 
through favorable public sector decisions (Tullock 1967; Buchanan 1980; Tollison 
1982). But, whereas the traditional rent-seeking literature models politicians as 
passively responding to rent-seeking activities by private-sector agents, in the context of 
corruption, public sector agents may have a private interest in responding favorably to 
rent-seekers or even take the initiative in creating the rents through policy, so as to 
pocket their share (McChesney 1997; Lambsdorff 2002). From this perspective, the 
potential of large rents from public policies is likely to lead to more corruption both 
because of the rent-seeking efforts of private-sector agents and because of the 
responsiveness or initiative of corrupt public sector officials.
2
   
                                                          
2
 Corruption through bribes is not the same as lobbying, another form of rent-seeking 
(Lambsdorff 2002; Svensson 2005). Lobby groups achieve policy changes that are favorable to 
other firms in their sector while the benefits of bribing tend to accrue to the bribing firm. 
Moreover, decisions in response to lobbying are likely to be made by governments weighing the 
benefits of additional income against the political costs of benefiting particular groups, while 
those in response to bribes will tend to be made by individual public officials who consider their 
private costs and benefits. Finally, because bribes are illegal while lobbying is not necessarily 
so, the former are more likely to remain hidden.  
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This discussion sheds light on how the construction sector may facilitate corruption. 
The limited competition in the sector together with the major role of government as 
clients, regulators, and owners of construction companies (Sohail and Cavill 2008; 
Kenny 2009) describes a setting in which, on the demand side, private agents have an 
incentive to bribe public officials in exchange for favorable decisions and, on the supply 
side, public officials have an incentive to favor companies in exchange for bribes, 
leading to the expectation that countries wherein the construction sector is relatively 
important will tend to experience more corruption.  
The positive association between the size of the construction sector and corruption (both 
that involving public officials and that between private agents) has been picked up by 
several surveys. Since 1999, Transparency International’s Bribe Payer’s Index (BPI) 
has reported company executives’ perceptions of the likelihood that companies from 28 
leading countries (the G-20 plus eight) win business abroad by paying bribes (Hardoon 
and Heinrich 2011). The executives surveyed by Transparency International consider 
that companies doing business in the public works and construction sectors are the ones 
most likely to bribe to obtain contracts. Moreover, the BPI finds that countries in which 
companies are more likely to pay bribes abroad are also those with higher levels of 
perceived corruption at home. The positive association between the construction sector 
and corruption abroad likewise has been reported by the OECD based on actual 
corruption cases brought to light (OECD 2014). Of the 427 cases of corruption of public 
officials between 1999 and 2014, the OECD found that companies from the extractive 
industries were most likely to engage in corrupt practices, followed closely by those in 
the construction, transportation and storage sectors. 
Despite the existence of numerous country case studies and survey evidence indicating 
the possible positive effects of the construction industry on corruption, to our 
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knowledge this relationship has not received any systematic empirical attention. At 
most, previous work has reported regressions of bribes paid to obtain construction 
permits on the log of GDP per capita, finding a negative relationship in a cross-section 
of 29 countries (Kenny 2009). We propose, for the first time, to analyze econometrically 
the impact of the construction sector on corruption.  To do so, we rely on a panel of 42 
countries over a 17-year period. Our empirical approach controls for the confounding 
influence of a range of variables. Moreover, we make some effort to account for the 
possibility of reverse causality. In this respect, several authors have examined the extent 
to which corruption can affect the development of the construction sector and, more 
generally, the composition of public expenditures. The point of departure of this line of 
work is Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who argue that corrupt governments are likely to 
favor infrastructure and defense projects where corruption opportunities are abundant 
(compared to spending on say, education and health). The empirical evidence largely is 
supportive of this conjecture since corrupt countries tend to overinvest in public 
infrastructure, which, moreover, tends to be of lower quality (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), 
to spend less on infrastructure maintenance than on new capital projects, spend more on 
defense (Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 2001) and less on education (Mauro 1997, 1998) 
and social welfare programs (Hessami 2014). Drawing on evidence across US states, 
Liu and Mikesell (2014) report that corruption increases spending on public 
construction projects and reduces spending on education and health. This work is 
important in its own right, but for our purposes here, it alerts us to the possibility that 
the direction of causality between corruption and construction runs both ways. We 
describe how we deal with this issue in the next section.  
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3 Data and empirical method  
Our measure of the construction sector’s size is the ratio of gross value added (GVA) of 
that sector to total GVA and comes from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) 
Socio-economic Accounts (SEA), a source that provides industry-level time series for 
40 countries from 1995 to 2011. Specifically, the WIOD-SEA reports information on 
gross value added, by country, disaggregated across 35 industries, including the 
construction industry.3 We expand our sample using data from the OECD’s Database 
for Structural Analysis (STAN). Our final sample comprises 27 EU countries (Croatia is 
not included), three other European countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), 
Russia, Turkey and four Asian countries (India, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan), 
four American countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the United States) plus Australia 
and New Zealand (see appendix A for the list of countries and appendix B for data 
definitions and sources). 
Although the WIOD-SEA is silent on the subcomponents of the construction variable, 
the European Commission’s Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO) provides 
data on the composition of the construction sector for most of the OECD countries that 
we study in this article. It shows that between 1995 and 2011, construction of dwellings 
accounted for almost 40% of the sector, while non-residential construction and civil 
engineering comprised the remainder. As such, our measure of construction could be 
divided into two large subsets: one basically financed by the private sector (dwellings) 
and another mostly financed by the public purse. 
                                                          
3
 Timmer et al. (2015) provides an overview of the contents, sources and methods used in 
compiling the World Input-Output Database and surveys recent work employing this source. 
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We, moreover, propose to measure the importance of construction by multiplying the 
previous variable by country GDP (in logs). The reason for this is to take into account 
not just the weight or relative size of the sector in the economy, but also to control for 
the amounts of resources involved. Doing so can capture the possibility that during an 
economic expansion (contraction), the weight of construction in the economy may 
remain stable, but the amount of resources and thus rents generated by the sector may 
experience a significant increase (decrease), something that may have a bearing on 
corruption.
4
 For instance, Slovenia (1997), Portugal (1998), the Netherlands (1999) and 
Sweden (2000) grew by almost 5% (during the specified years), while the ratio of 
construction to total GVA remained very stable. Alternatively, the Baltic countries 
experienced a very severe economic crisis in 2009 (with GDP reductions exceeding 
10%), but at the same time the share of construction in GVA remained constant. 
Consequently, just considering the relative size of the construction sector would not 
necessarily capture the quantity of resources employed in it, something that is likely to 
affect the extent of corruption in that sector.  
To measure corruption, we rely on the World Governance Indicators (WGI). 
Specifically, we employ the Control of Corruption measure from that source, which 
measures “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2010, p. 4). This indicator has been widely 
used in research empirically calibrating the causes and consequences of corruption. It 
varies between -2.5 and 2.5: larger values reflect less perceived corruption. In our 
                                                          
4
 In this relation, Jiménez (2009) describes how the building boom in Spain fuelled political 
corruption there. 
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sample of countries, perceived corruption is greatest in Russia, Indonesia and India, 
while it is lowest in Scandinavia and New Zealand (see appendix C for the summary 
statistics). As a robustness check, we also employ an alternative measure of perceived 
corruption, namely that provided by the Political Risk Services group in the context of 
their International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
The use of perception-based corruption data has been criticized because they do not 
correlate well with measures of reported corruption experience, typically drawn from 
survey questions asking individuals if they have paid a bribe (see, most recently, 
Heywood 2015 and Treisman 2015, although Charron 2015 presents evidence to the 
contrary). But data on reported bribes paid may also be biased insofar as “questions are 
politically sensitive, personally embarrassing or could lead to criminal sanctions”, thus 
leading those surveyed to lie or underreport bribery incidents or, typically, not to 
respond at all to these type of questions (Jensen and Rahman 2015, p. 154; see also 
Treisman 2015). Notable cross-country sources of reported bribery are the United 
Nations International Crime Victims Survey, Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer and the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. The limited overlap 
between the available construction and bribery data does not allow us to rigorously test 
the robustness of our empirical findings using the latter. This said, with the data at hand, 
the simple correlation between the Control of Corruption measure and reported bribes 
from the Global Corruption Barometer is -0.702 (p-value of 0), indicating that the 
perceptions-based indicator we employ may be a reasonable proxy for reported 
corruption. 
As a first step in examining empirically the relationship between the construction sector 
and corruption, we plot the Control of Corruption measure against our two construction 
sector indicators. To simplify the presentation, we use average values for each variable 
12 
 
over the sample period (1995-2011). The graphs are suggestive of a negative association 
between Control of Corruption and the construction sector’s relative size or, in other 
words, a larger sector is associated with more corruption. Figure 1 shows that the 
construction sector is relatively small in countries like Malta, New Zealand, Hungary 
and Norway, while it accounts for a larger portion of gross value added in Spain, 
Iceland, Cyprus and South Korea. A slightly different picture emerges from Figure 2 
that plots the corruption measure against the indicator aimed at capturing the volume of 
resources employed in the construction sector. Now Spain, South Korea, Japan and 
India have larger construction sectors. The US construction sector also looks larger 
from this perspective. While the two figures are suggestive of a negative association 
between clean government and construction activity, they are of course silent on both 
the counfounding influence of other factors as well as the direction of causality. In what 
remains in this section we explain how we address those two important concerns.  
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
We estimate the following model:  
Control of Corruptionit = α + βConstructionit + γXit +εit,        (1) 
where i refers to countries and t to years, α is a constant, Xit is the vector of control 
variables and εit is the error term. Given our previous discussion we expect β<0. Since 
we have substantially more cross-section units than time periods, we follow Beck and 
Katz (1995) and estimate the model using OLS with panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) employing cross-section clustering or a covariance structure that computes 
standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation between the 
residuals for a given cross-section (Period SUR). Because of the limited within-country 
variation in the Control of Corruption measure in our sample (see appendix C), we do 
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not apply cross-section fixed effects (see Baltagi 2013). Alternatively, we do introduce 
period fixed effects to account for the influence of unknown or unobservable time 
varying factors affecting all our cross-section units.  
Our set of control variables is chosen so as to minimize omitted variable bias. In 
particular, we control for the logarithm of real GDP per capita, a country’s population 
(in logs), public sector size, the openness of the economy, the importance of the oil and 
mining sectors (all as percentages of GDP), a measure of inter-personal income 
inequalities (a Gini index based on disposable income), the extent to which local 
governments have fiscal and political autonomy, and legal origins.  
Accounting for the level of development allows us to control for the possibility that the 
relative importance of different economic sectors may vary with income (Imbs and 
Wacziarg 2003). Moreover, wealthier countries may be able to afford better quality 
public institutions (Islam and Montenegro 2002). We control for population since larger 
countries may be more difficult to govern (Treisman 2002), or may enjoy economies of 
scale in anti-corruption measures (Knack and Azfar 2003). The evolution of population 
over time is also likely to influence positively the demand for private and public 
construction. The need to control for the size of the public sector takes account of the 
fact that a larger public sector offers more opportunities for rent creation and, thus, 
facilitates corruption (Tanzi 1998). The resources available to the state likely determines 
its capacity for undertaking public construction projects.  
Given our previous discussion, we also account for the importance of natural resources 
in a country’s gross domestic product since this determines the availability of rents 
potentially captured by corrupt officials. The availability of rents also depends on the 
openness of the economy to trade, since competition from foreign firms will tend to 
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reduce the rents enjoyed by domestic firms and, hence, the returns to corruption (Ades 
and di Tella 1999). Controls for the natural resource base and country openness also are 
warranted because both are likely to affect the sectoral specialization of the economy 
and thus, the relative size of the construction sector.  
Because inter-personal income inequalities have been identified as potential 
determinants of corruption we also control for them (You and Khagram 2005; Uslaner 
2010). Income inequalities may, moreover, influence the size of the construction sector 
either because they affect the capacity of individuals to purchase housing in the private 
sector or because they affect the demand for public services, which may imply public 
construction. We moreover control for the degree of fiscal and political autonomy 
enjoyed by local governments (Ivanyna and Shah 2014). Previous work has reported 
that greater dependence on one’s own fiscal resources tends to reduce corruption 
because inter-jurisdictional competition for tax base disciplines subnational 
governments, while the election rather than appointment of local politicians has been 
linked to corruption, possibly because the proximity of public officials increases the 
likelihood of their capture by special interests (Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 2011a, 
2011b). Controlling for local government autonomy is also warranted by the fact that 
local government decisions – for example the zoning of land as subject to building or 
not and the concession of building permits – affect the construction of new housing 
(see, for example, Wollman 2008 and Jimenez 2009).  
Finally, we control for legal origins since scholars have argued that the depth and scope 
of state intervention – and thus possibilities for corruption – will tend to be greatest in 
countries with a Soviet legal tradition, lower in ones with a tradition of civil law 
(represented by the French, German and Scandinavian civil codes) and lowest in 
countries with common law systems (La Porta el al. 1999). Legal origins have also been 
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linked to the regulation of entry of new firms and from there to the size of unofficial 
economies (Djankov et al. 2002). To the extent that either of these variables may affect 
the relationship between corruption and the construction sector, legal origin helps us to 
control for their confounding effect.
5
  
A major concern when trying to identify the relationship between construction and 
corruption is the possibility of reverse causality. While the construction sector may 
facilitate corruption, it could also be the case that officials in more corrupt countries 
may adopt policies favoring the construction sector to the detriment of other sectors that 
do not provide similar opportunities for appropriating rents. Not accounting for this 
feedback effect is likely to generate point estimates of the impact of construction on 
corruption that are biased downward (since more effective control of corruption is likely 
to be associated with a smaller construction sector).  
To deal with this issue we resort to two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation wherein 
we instrument our measures of the construction industry with the percentage of 
population between 25 and 49 years of age and a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 in the presence of national elections and zero otherwise. The demographic variable 
helps us account for the construction of private dwellings because individuals within 
this age range are more likely to demand housing, while those below this range may still 
be living with their parents or renting, and those above this age group may have already 
bought a house.
6
 Alternatively, the national elections dummy is useful in capturing 
                                                          
5
 In the results section below we also report regressions that control for the importance of the 
shadow economy based on data from Schneider et al. (2010).  
6
 See, Jafee et al. (1979), Mankiw and Weil (1989) and Lindh and Malberg (2008) for empirical 
evidence linking age cohorts to private housing demand. 
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construction projects financed by the public sector on the assumption that during 
election periods, governments will tend to over-spend on infrastructure, which is a 
visible and discretionary component of public spending (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).
7
 We 
are careful to exclude early or snap elections when constructing the elections dummy to 
reduce the possibility of corruption affecting this variable. As additional robustness 
checks, we also employ lagged values of the construction measures as instruments – a 
strategy that is supported by the existence of fairly high within-country variability in 
these measures (see Appendix C).  
4 Empirical results 
Table 1 presents a first set of regressions of Control of Corruption on the measures of 
the construction sector and the control variables. Columns 1 to 3 employ the share of 
construction in GVA, while the last three columns show the results when entering the 
alternative measure of the construction sector that accounts for the volume of resources. 
The estimated impact of the control variables is in line with that found in previous 
studies. Focusing on the statistically significant coefficients, the results indicate that the 
level of income and the degree of fiscal autonomy of municipal governments are 
positively associated with Control of Corruption, while clean government is negatively 
related to the political autonomy of local governments, the relative importance of 
natural resources and French and Soviet legal origins (compared to having a British 
common law tradition). The results also indicate that a larger population tends to be 
associated with more corruption, lending some support to the suggestion that smaller 
                                                          
7 Brender and Drazen (2005) have employed a similar approach to test for the presence of a 
political business cycle in the form of expansionary fiscal policy during election periods. 
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countries may be better governed, although this finding is not robust across all 
specifications.    
Table 1 about here 
The results in Table 1 indicate that construction is negatively associated with Control of 
Corruption at statistically significant levels. Regressions 1 and 4 report OLS estimates 
and the remaining regressions are TSLS. Compared to the OLS regressions, employing 
TSLS tends to increase both the estimated impact and statistical significance of 
construction on corruption. This is consistent with the presence of reverse causality, 
something that, recall, should reduce the OLS point estimates. In panel B of Table 1 we, 
moreover, report the first stage regressions of the TSLS estimates. The t-statitstics of the 
instruments employed – the age cohort and the national elections dummy (regression 2 
and 5) or the lagged value of the construction indicator (regressions 3 and 6) – suggest 
that the instruments are valid. This is confirmed by the F-statistics of the first-stage 
regressions that are always above the required critical values (see Staiger and Stock 
1997 and Stock and Yogo 2005).  
The estimated impact of construction on corruption is economically significant. 
Focusing on the results reported in the second column of Table 1, a one-standard 
deviation increase in construction as a share of GVA, reduces the Control of Corruption 
measure by 0.280 points or around 29% of a standard deviation in the Control of 
Corruption index. By way of illustration, consider South Korea and Belgium. Focusing 
on average values over the sample period, Korea’s and Belgium’s construction sectors 
represent, respectively, 7.828% and 5.037% of total GVA, while the corresponding 
Control of Corruption scores are 0.403 and 1.382 respectively. This implies that almost 
29% of the corruption gap between South Korea and Belgium can be explained by the 
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larger weight of the construction sector in the former country. Based on the same 
reasoning, our results suggest that 19% of the difference in the corruption scores 
between Poland and Germany may owe to the former’s larger construction sector.  
Table 2 about here 
In Table 2 we further examine the issue of reverse causality. Specifically, we employ 
longer lags of the construction measures as instruments in TSLS regressions taking lags 
of up to four years. While doing so reduces the F-statitistic from the first-stage 
regression, this is still always well above the desirable critical value of 10.  Longer lags 
can help reduce the correlation between the instruments and the disturbances resulting 
from the existence of reverse causality and, indeed, the estimated impact of construction 
on corruption increases with the length of the lag, thereby supporting the view that 
corruption may also affect the size of the construction sector.  
We pursue the robustness of our results further in Table 3 where, again, we employ 
TSLS. In columns 1 and 2 of this table, we replace the measures of fiscal and political 
decentralization with an alternative indicator proposed by Ivanyna and Shah (2014). In 
addition to incorporating information on the degree of fiscal and political autonomy 
enjoyed by local governments, this measure includes information on their administrative 
autonomy (the share of local government employment in general government 
employment and the extent to which local governments can choose human resources 
policy), and the security of local governments (as measured by the constitutional and 
legal restraints on their arbitrary dismissal by higher level governments). This 
alternative measure, called Decentralization Index, is not associated with corruption at 
statistically significant levels, which, perhaps, is to be expected since it incorporates the 
notions of fiscal and political autonomy that relate to corruption in opposite ways. More 
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importantly for our purposes here, our substantive results remain unchanged: we 
continue to find that construction has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
Control of Corruption.  
Table 3 about here 
In columns 3 and 4 of the table we additionally control for the confounding influence of 
culture as captured by the size of different religions in a country. Several authors have 
related Protestantism to less corruption and Catholicism, Islam and the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition to more, perhaps because the latter three are more hierarchical and, 
as such, inculcate values that make people less likely to challenge public office holders 
(La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000; North et al. 2013). Moreover, Guiso et al. (2003) 
report systematic differences between individuals from different religions across a range 
of economic attitudes on issues such as tax evasion, public versus private ownership, the 
importance of luck and chance versus hard work for success, the importance of thrift, 
and whether competition is good or harmful. These attitudes potentially could have 
some influence on both the demand and supply sides of the private and public 
construction markets, thus justifying the need to control for different types of religions 
in our estimates. As shown in the table, these variables do not have a statistically 
significant impact in our sample and the estimated impact of construction is robust to 
their introduction. 
Regressions 5 and 6 report the results when controlling for the importance of shadow 
economies. As expected, a larger unofficial economy has a negative impact on 
perceptions of clean government. The impact of construction also continues to be 
negative and statistically significant. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 show the results when 
using an alternative measure of corruption from the ICRG. In our sample, this indicator 
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varies between 1 and 6, and higher values reflect a lower risk of corruption. The use of 
this indicator as the dependent variable does not change our results. Finally, in columns 
9 and 10 we report the results of employing five-year averages of the data. The 
significant reduction in the sample size acts as a further robustness check. Moreover, 
because our decentralization and legal origin indicators are constant over time, adopting 
this approach goes some way toward accounting for the possibility that our panel results 
are being driven by repeated entries. Finally, the use of five-year averages also helps 
control for the business cycle and, thus, to focus on the structural relationship between 
the main variables of interest. As can be seen, employing five-year averages does not 
change our substantive results.
8
  
5 Conclusion 
The construction industry is vital to national prosperity. The construction and 
maintenance of public infrastructure is an indispensable component of a productive 
economy. And the construction sector, both private and public, is important in its own 
right, accounting for a sizeable share of a country’s output and employment. According 
to the European Commission (2013), the construction sector accounts for almost 10% of 
European Union GDP and 20 million direct jobs; similar figures are reported for OECD 
countries (OECD 2008). This may be one reason why policymakers aim to promote the 
development of this industry. A case in point is Construction 2020, an action plan 
adopted by the European Commission to promote the sector by way of more favorable 
investment conditions, human capital improvements, better resource efficiency, and the 
                                                          
8
 We also check the robustness of our results to both the exclusion of any particular country 
from the sample and the omission of pairs of potential outliers (for example, Iceland-Spain and 
Indonesia-Russia). Our results are preserved and are available upon request.  
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strengthening of both the internal market for construction and the globally competitive 
position of EU construction firms (European Commission 2014). 
In this article we have argued that because the construction sector is characterized by 
potentially large rents and government intervention, it may contribute towards public 
sector malfeasance. Our empirical evidence, based on a sample of 42 countries over the 
1995-2011 period and accounting for both the confounding effect of other variables and 
the possibility that corrupt officials may favor the development of the construction 
sector, provides robust support for the negative impact of construction on perceptions of 
the extent to which corruption is controled.  
The analysis supports calls for adopting anti-corruption measures in this industry at the 
same time it recognizes that public officials in corrupt countries may tend to resist 
policies that lessen their access to rents. One set of measures that has been put forward 
aims at increasing transparency in the dealings of both construction firms and 
governments by, for example, empowering wistleblowers in both the private and public 
sectors through implementing appropriate policies and procedures (Sohail and Cavill 
2008; Hardoon and Heinrich 2011). Another measure refers to the adoption of ethical 
codes and related training programs for construction industry professionals such as the 
Australian National Code of Practice of the Construction Industry (Le et al. 2014). 
Beyond the obvious policy of raising the legal penalties facing those convicted of 
corruption, others have suggested the adoption of a debarment system – already in force 
in the European Union – whereby companies or individuals who are found guilty of 
corruption are prevented from participating in future construction projects (Jong et al. 
2009). Finally, to the extent that corruption in the construction industry is explained by 
imperfect competition, then promoting competition, especially in relation to bids for 
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public sector construction projects, is clearly a desirable policy (see also Ades and Di 
Tella 1999 and Kenny 2009).  
Our evidence is consistent with that reporting a deleterious effect on governance coming 
from another economic sector characterized by substantial rents and state involvement, 
namely the natural resource sector. That literature has, moreover, reported evidence of a 
resource curse whereby the abundance of natural resources has a negative impact on 
economic growth both directly because it crowds out other sectors (Sachs and Warner 
1995), but also indirectly, through its negative effect on governance (Leite and 
Weidmann 2002; Bulte et al. 2005; Isham et al. 2005, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
2013). Our analysis is silent on the direct effect of the construction sector on growth 
rates (see, for example, Wilhemsson and Wigren 2011), but it is suggestive of an 
indirect negative effect transmitted through corruption’s harmful effect on governance. 
We leave it for future research efforts to fully explore this important issue.  
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Appendix A: Country codes and countries  
Country Code Country 
AUS Australia 
AUT Austria 
BEL Belgium 
BRA Brasil 
BGR Bulgaria 
CAN Canada 
CYP Cyprus 
CZE Czech Republic 
DNK Denmark 
EST Estonia 
FIN Finland 
FRA France 
DEU Germany 
GRC Greece 
HUN Hungary 
ISL Iceland 
IND India 
IDN Indonesia 
IRL Ireland 
ITA Italy 
JPN Japan 
KOR Korea, Republic of 
LVA Latvia 
LTU Lithuania 
LUX Luxembourg 
MLT Malta 
MEX Mexico 
NLD Netherlands 
NZL New Zealand 
NOR Norway 
POL Poland 
PRT Portugal 
ROU Romania 
RUS Russia 
SVK Slovak Republic 
SVN Slovenia 
ESP Spain 
SWE Sweden 
CHE Switzerland 
TUR Turkey 
GBR United Kingdom 
USA United States 
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Appendix B: Data definitions and sources  
Control of Corruption – WGI Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower values imply a 
higher level of corruption (World Governance Indicators, World Bank).  
Corruption – ICRG Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower values imply a 
higher level of corruption (International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk 
Services Group).  
Construction Gross value added of the construction sector divided by total gross value added 
(World Input-Output Database Socio-economic Accounts (WIOD SEA) and 
OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis (ISIC Rev. 3)). 
GDP Real GDP in logs Penn World Table 8.0 database (RGDPNA, 2005 PPP$). 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in logs Penn World Table 8.0 database (RGDPCNA, 2005 
PPP$). 
Population 
Population 25-49 
Total population (Word Development Indicators, World Bank). 
Percentage of total population by broad age group, both sexes per 100 total 
population. (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision). 
National Elections A dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the presence of national (legislative or 
presidential) election and 0 otherwise, and excluding early or snap elections. 
Source: Wikipedia.  
Government Size Government consumption as a percentage of GDP at current PPPs (Penn World 
Tables, Version 8.0). 
Natural Resources Sum of Oil and Mineral Rents (World Development Indicators). 
Openness Percentage of exports plus imports divided by Real GDP (World Penn Tables).  
Inequality Gini coefficient based on net income inequality (Solt 2014). 
Fiscal Decentralization Fiscal autonomy of local governments measured by the extent that they are 
independent from higher level funds, tax, expenditure and borrowing autonomy 
(Ivanyna and Shah 2014).   
Political Decentralization Election of mayor and local council members and direct democracy provisions 
for major tax, spending and regulatory decision and the recall of public officials 
(Ivanyna and Shah 2014). 
Decentralization Index Fiscal and political decentralization plus information on the degree of 
administrative autonomy and the security of existence of local governments 
(Ivanyna and Shah 2014).  
Legal Origins Dummy variables that identify the legal origin of the company law or 
commercial code of each country. There are five dummies: (1) English common 
law; (2) French commercial code; (3) German commercial code; (4) 
Scandinavian commercial code; (5) socialist communist laws (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
Religion Largest religions (Catholic, Protestants, Muslim and Eastern Orthodox) as a 
percentage of population in 2000 (North et al. 2013). 
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Appendix C: Summary statistics  
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
Control of Corruption (WDI) Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.0824 0.9627 
0.9797 
0.1610 
-1.1339 
-0.9182 
0.2253 
2.5856 
2.4494 
1.8143 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Construction Overall 
Between 
Within 
6.3201 1.6193 
1.3001 
0.9919 
3.3935 
3.9888 
2.5417 
12.1715 
9.9559 
10.4132 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of GDP*Construction Overall 
Between 
Within 
78.7840 21.1620 
17.4634 
12.1866 
33.4387 
35.9099 
38.1422 
168.8028 
138.5451 
119.1916 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Population between 25 and 49 
years 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
36.3164 1.878572 
1.759675 
.9172818 
30.334 
31.17833 
33.22331 
42.312 
41.72646 
40.172 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
National Elections Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.3069 0.4617 
0.1057 
0.4497 
0 
0.1538 
0.2316 
1 
0.5385 
1 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of GDP Overall 
Between 
Within 
12.5335 1.6923 
1.7331 
0.1354 
8.8589 
9.0025 
11.989 
16.3977 
16.3486 
12.9787 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of GDP per capita Overall 
Between 
Within 
9.9592 0.6667 
0.6727 
0.1216 
7.4180 
7.7798 
9.4034 
11.0484 
10.9679 
10.3150 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Log of Population Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.5743 1.8129 
1.8765 
0.0324 
1.2888 
1.2051 
2.4435 
7.1104 
7.0209 
2.6695 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Public Sector Size  Overall 
Between 
Within 
34.3938 13.0572 
12.4831 
5.8327 
9.9236 
12.3065 
0.8256 
99.000 
74.1870 
68.9271 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Natural Resources Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.3521 3.2090 
3.3060 
0.6979 
0 
0 
1.9322 
19.9332 
16.6884 
4.8411 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Openness Overall 
Between 
Within 
92.5818 50.4575 
50.9919 
10.6794 
15.8650 
24.5443 
45.7050 
333.5322 
295.4356 
130.6784 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Inequality Overall 
Between 
Within 
31.5879 6.2676 
6.5437 
1.3584 
20.7933 
23.5389 
26.0799 
53.2056 
49.5488 
36.1348 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
Fiscal Decentralization Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.5970 0.2149 
0.2178 
 
0.1000 
0.1000 
 
0.9600 
0.9600 
 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T = 1 
Political Decentralization Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.6821  0.1313 
0.1378 
 
0.4200 
0.4200 
 
1 
1 
 
N = 479 
n = 42 
T-bar = 11.4048 
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Fig. 1 Control of corruption and construction as a percentage of GVA (average values over the 
period 1995-2011) 
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Fig. 2 Control of corruption and construction sector volume (average values over the period 
1995-2011) 
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Table 1 The impact of construction on control of corruption    
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
TSLS 
(3) 
TSLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
TSLS 
(6) 
TSLS 
Panel A. Second stage: Dependent variable is Control of Corruption 
Construction (% GVA) 
-0.048* 
(0.026) 
-0.173** 
(0.072) 
-0.059** 
(0.029) 
-- -- -- 
(Log of GDP) *Construction -- -- -- 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
Log of GDP per Capita  
0.670*** 
(0.115) 
0.649*** 
(0.118) 
0.669*** 
(0.114) 
0.689*** 
(0.116) 
0.713*** 
(0.117) 
0.691*** 
(0.115) 
Log of Population 
-0.094** 
(0.047) 
-0.148*** 
(0.055) 
-0.098** 
(0.047) 
-0.069 
(0.046) 
-0.060 
(0.047) 
-0.069 
(0.045) 
Public Sector Size (% GDP) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Natural Resources (% GDP) 
-0.039*** 
(0.016) 
-0.051*** 
(0.018) 
-0.040** 
(0.016) 
-0.038*** 
(0.016) 
-0.049*** 
(0.017) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
Openness (% GDP) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Inequality 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
Fiscal Decentralization 
0.824*** 
(0.302) 
0.722** 
(0.310) 
0.816*** 
(0.300) 
0.829*** 
(0.301) 
0.747** 
(0.308) 
0.822*** 
(0.299) 
Political Decentralization 
-1.207*** 
(0.446) 
-1.592*** 
(0.506) 
-1.239*** 
(0.445) 
-1.243*** 
(0.448) 
-1.674*** 
(0.520) 
-1.279*** 
(0.447) 
Legal French 
-0.668*** 
(0.142) 
-0.687*** 
(0.145) 
-0.670*** 
(0.141) 
-0.664*** 
(0.141) 
-0.672*** 
(0.143) 
-0.665*** 
(0.141) 
Legal German 
-0.322* 
(0.195) 
-0.328* 
(0.198) 
-0.323* 
(0.193) 
-0.318* 
(0.194) 
-0.314 
(0.197) 
-0.318 
(0.193) 
Legal Scandinavian 
-0.074 
(0.227) 
-0.210 
(0.245) 
-0.085 
(0.227) 
-0.083 
(0.227) 
-0.227 
(0.247) 
-0.095 
(0.226) 
Legal Soviet 
-1.025*** 
(0.173) 
-1.023*** 
(0.177) 
-1.025*** 
(0.172) 
-1.030*** 
(0.172) 
-1.040*** 
(0.176) 
-1.031*** 
(0.171) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.869 0.835 0.868 0.869 0.839 0.869 
Panel B. First stage: Dependent variable is Construction 
Population 25-49   
0.353*** 
(0.082) 
  
4.530*** 
(1.030) 
 
National Elections   
0.296*** 
(0.084) 
  
3.568*** 
(1.029) 
 
Construction (lagged)    
0.928*** 
(0.021) 
  
0.939*** 
(0.020) 
Adjusted R
2
   0.357 0.888  0.433 0.912 
F-statistic from first stage  11.227 153.22  15.057 200.08 
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions report Period SUR panel corrected standard errors and include 
period fixed effects. Construction is instrumented using both the percentage of population between 25 and 49 years old and 
a dummy accounting for national elections (regressions 2 and 5) and employing 1-year lagged values of the corresponding 
construction indicator (regressions 3 and 6). All regressions include a constant and the full set of control variables (not 
shown in the panel B).  
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Table 2 The impact of construction on control of corruption (TSLS)   
 
(1) 
Two lags 
(2) 
Three lag 
(3) 
Four lags 
(4) 
Two lags 
(5) 
Three lags 
(6) 
Four lags 
Panel A. Second stage: Dependent variable is Control of Corruption 
Construction (% GVA) 
-0.076** 
(0.034) 
-0.094** 
(0.041) 
-0.120** 
(0.051) 
-- -- -- 
(Log of GDP) *Construction -- -- -- 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
Log of GDP per Capita  
0.663*** 
(0.114) 
0.659*** 
(0.114) 
0.645*** 
(0.118) 
0.691*** 
(0.115) 
0.694*** 
(0.114) 
0.686*** 
(0.118) 
Log of Population 
-0.111** 
(0.047) 
-0.118** 
(0.047) 
-0.130*** 
(0.049) 
-0.072 
(0.045) 
-0.070 
(0.045) 
-0.070 
(0.046) 
Public Sector Size (% GDP) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Natural Resources (% GDP) 
-0.042*** 
(0.016) 
-0.044*** 
(0.016) 
-0.047*** 
(0.017) 
-0.042*** 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.016) 
-0.045*** 
(0.016) 
Openness (% GDP) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Inequality 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
Fiscal Decentralization 
0.823*** 
(0.298) 
0.807*** 
(0.298) 
0.802*** 
(0.305) 
0.834*** 
(0.298) 
0.822*** 
(0.297) 
0.826*** 
(0.303) 
Political Decentralization 
-1.330*** 
(0.446) 
-1.386*** 
(0.449) 
-1.472*** 
(0.463) 
-1.371*** 
(0.449) 
-1.428*** 
(0.453) 
-1.517*** 
(0.467) 
Legal French 
-0.658*** 
(0.142) 
-0.660*** 
(0.141) 
-0.663*** 
(0.145) 
-0.653*** 
(0.141) 
-0.653*** 
(0.141) 
-0.654*** 
(0.144) 
Legal German 
-0.307 
(0.192) 
-0.310 
(0.191) 
-0.318 
(0.195) 
-0.301 
(0.192) 
-0.304 
(0.191) 
-0.308 
(0.194) 
Legal Scandinavian 
-0.087 
(0.226) 
-0.106 
(0.227) 
-0.110 
(0.233) 
-0.097 
(0.227) 
-0.115 
(0.227) 
-0.121 
(0.233) 
Legal Soviet 
-1.002*** 
(0.171) 
-1.001*** 
(0.171) 
-1.005*** 
(0.174) 
-1.011*** 
(0.171) 
-1.012*** 
(0.170) 
-1.021*** 
(0.173) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.872 0.869 0.864 0.872 0.870 0.867 
Panel B. First stage: Dependent variable is Construction 
Construction (lagged)  
0.805*** 
(0.043) 
0.693*** 
(0.059) 
0.613*** 
(0.076) 
0.837*** 
(0.040) 
0.742*** 
(0.057) 
0.671*** 
(0.074) 
Adjusted R
2
  0.730 0.596 0.505 0.787 0.674 0.591 
F-statistic from first stage 51.887 28.832 19.830 70.467 39.893 27.669 
Observations 453 453 425 453 453 425 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions report Period SUR panel corrected standard errors and 
include period fixed effects. Construction is instrumented using 2, 3 and 4-year lagged values of the corresponding 
construction indicator. All regressions include a constant and the full set of control variables (not shown in the 
panel B). 
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Table 3 Robustness analysis (TSLS)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Panel A. Second stage: Dependent variable is Control of Corruption 
Construction (%  GVA) 
-0.171** 
(0.084) 
-- 
-0.183** 
(0.076) 
-- 
-0.113* 
(0.069) 
-- 
 
-0.406** 
(0.164) 
-- 
-0.107** 
(0.049) 
-- 
(Log of GDP) *Construction -- 
-0.013** 
(0.007) 
-- 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-- 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-- 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
-- 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Log of GDP per Capita  
0.653*** 
(0.126) 
0.710*** 
(0.127) 
0.529*** 
(0.127) 
0.584*** 
(0.126) 
0.662*** 
(0.106) 
0.710*** 
(0.107) 
0.327 
(0.257) 
0.480* 
(0.254) 
0.665*** 
(0.130) 
0.702*** 
(0.130) 
Log of Population 
-0.103* 
(0.059) 
-0.018 
(0.059) 
-0.144*** 
(0.055) 
-0.052 
(0.048) 
-0.140** 
(0.058) 
-0.079* 
(0.043) 
-0.302** 
(0.127) 
-0.096 
(0.104) 
-0.120** 
(0.051) 
-0.068 
(0.050) 
Public Sector Size (% GDP) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Natural Resources (% GDP) 
-0.054** 
(0.021) 
-0.051** 
(0.021) 
-0.047*** 
(0.018) 
-0.044** 
(0.017) 
-0.041** 
(0.016) 
-0.040** 
(0.016) 
-0.040 
(0.041) 
-0.035 
(0.040) 
-0.044** 
(0.018) 
-0.042** 
(0.018) 
Openness (% GDP) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Inequality 
-0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.030) 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
Fiscal Decentralization -- -- 
0.491 
(0.325) 
0.503 
(0.322) 
0.238 
(0.337) 
0.271 
(0.331) 
1.475** 
(0.682) 
1.533** 
(0.672) 
0.891*** 
(0.325) 
0.911** 
(0.324) 
Political Decentralization -- -- 
-1.671*** 
(0.580) 
-1.763*** 
(0.596) 
-1.047** 
(0.442) 
-1.118** 
(0.464) 
-2.144* 
(1.139) 
-2.331** 
(1.166) 
-1.454*** 
(0.488) 
-1.499*** 
(0.494) 
Decentralization Index 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Legal French 
-0.623*** 
(0.163) 
-0.605*** 
(0.164) 
-0.729*** 
(0.185) 
-0.717*** 
(0.180) 
-0.411*** 
(0.150) 
-0.411*** 
(0.151) 
-0.764** 
(0.311) 
-0.729** 
(0.306) 
-0.659*** 
(0.154) 
-0.651*** 
(0.154) 
Legal German 
-0.441* 
(0.232) 
-0.442* 
(0.235) 
-0.329* 
(0.190) 
-0.315* 
(0.188) 
-0.158 
(0.184) 
-0.151 
(0.184) 
-0.836* 
(0.432) 
-0.802* 
(0.426) 
-0.300 
(0.209) 
-0.289 
(0.209) 
Legal Scandinavian 
0.182 
(0.362) 
0.152 
(0.364) 
-0.405 
(0.303) 
-0.418 
(0.299) 
0.252 
(0.240) 
0.228 
(0.246) 
-0.306 
(0.546) 
-0.340 
(0.545) 
-0.117 
(0.250) 
-0.124 
(0.250) 
Legal Soviet 
-1.047*** 
(0.204) 
-1.068*** 
(0.205) 
-1.123*** 
(0.186) 
-1.154*** 
(0.186) 
-0.639*** 
(0.219) 
-0.652*** 
(0.222) 
-1.363*** 
(0.387) 
-1.403*** 
(0.383) 
-0.965*** 
(0.190) 
-0.980*** 
(0.190) 
Shadow Economy -- -- -- -- 
-0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
    
Catholic 
-- -- 
0.389 
(0.324) 
0.404 
(0.322) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Protestant 
-- -- 
0.532 
(0.492) 
0.513 
(0.487) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Muslim 
-- -- 
-0.199 
(0.472) 
-0.284 
(0.466) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Orthodox 
-- -- 
0.086 
(0.388) 
0.072 
(0.381) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Adjusted R2  0.799 0.799 0.837 0.843 0.898 0.898 0.538 0.549 0.861 0.862 
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  Panel B. First stage where dependent variable is Construction 
Population 25-49  
0.347*** 
(0.080) 
4.457*** 
(1.038) 
0.319*** 
(0.071) 
4.089*** 
(0.872) 
0.360*** 
(0.105) 
1.497* 
(1.213) 
0.345*** 
(0.081) 
4.440*** 
(1.026) 
  
National Elections  
0.238*** 
(0.085) 
2.763*** 
(1.058) 
0.293*** 
(0.077) 
3.556*** 
(0.929) 
0.119* 
(0.099) 
4.617*** 
(1.313) 
0.287*** 
(0.084) 
3.473*** 
(1.035) 
  
Construction lagged  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
0.718*** 
(0.076) 
0.752*** 
(0.075) 
Adjusted R2  0.369 0.424 0.476 0.549 0.454 0.513 0.366 0.435 0.575 0.653 
F-statistic from first stage 12.173 15.057 15.265 20.145 11.146 13.863 11.494 14.953 11.827 16.080 
Observations 479 479 479 479 266 266 473 473 121 121 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All regressions report Period SUR panel corrected standard errors and include period fixed effects. Construction is instrumented using 
both the percentage of population between 25 and 49 years old and a dummy of national elections (regressions 1 to 8) and using 1 year lagged values of the corresponding 
construction measure (regressions 9 and 10). Regressions 7 and 8 employ the ICRG measure of corruption. Regressions 9 and 10 use 5-year averages of all the variables. All 
regressions include a constant and the full set of control variables (not shown in panel B). 
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